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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the equilibrium when negative stock market jumps (crashes) can occur, and
investors have heterogeneous attitudes towards crash risk.  The less crash-averse insure the more
crash-averse through the options markets that dynamically complete the economy.  The resulting
equilibrium is compared with various option pricing anomalies reported in the literature: the tendency of
stock index options to overpredict volatility and jump risk, the Jackwerth (2000) implicit pricing kernel
puzzle, and the stochastic evolution of option prices.  The specification of crash aversion is compatible
with the static option pricing puzzles, while heterogeneity partially explains the dynamic puzzles.
Heterogeneity also magnifies substantially the stock market impact of adverse news about fundamentals.
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Email: david-bates@uiowa.eduEmpirical option pricing research involving stock index options has revealed substantial divergences
between the “risk-neutral” distributions compatible with observed post-’87 option prices, and the
conditional distributions estimated from time series analyses of the underlying stock index.  Perhaps
the most important has been the substantial disparity between implicit standard deviations (ISD’s)
inferred from at-the-money options, and the subsequent realized volatility over the lifetime of the
option.  As illustrated below in Figure 1, ISD’s have generally been higher than realized volatility.
Furthermore, regressing realized volatility upon ISD’s almost invariably indicates that ISD’s are
informative but biased predictors of future volatility, with bias increasing in the ISD level.
While the level of at-the-money ISD’s is puzzling, the shape of the volatility surface across
strike prices and maturities also appears at odds with estimates of conditional distributions.  It is now
widely recognized that the “volatility smirk” implies substantial negative skewness in risk-neutral
distributions, and various correspondingly skewed models have been proposed: implied binomial
trees, stochastic volatility models with “leverage” effects, and jump-diffusions.  And although these
models can roughly match observed option prices, the associated implicit parameters do not appear
especially consistent with the absence of substantial negative skewness in post-’87 stock index
returns.  To paraphrase Samuelson, the option markets have predicted nine out of the past five
market corrections.  A further puzzle is that the predictions are somewhat countercyclical.  Within
the Bates (2000) jump-diffusion model, implicit jump risk was highest immediately after substantial
market drops, and was low during the bull market of 1992-96.
It is of course possible that the pronounced divergence between objective and risk-neutral
measures represents risk premia on the underlying risks.  The fundamental theorem of asset pricing
states that provided there exist no outright arbitrage opportunities, it is possible to construct a
“representative agent” whose preferences are compatible with any observed divergences between
the two distributions.  However, Jackwerth (2000) and Rosenberg and Engle (2000) have pointed
out that the preferences necessary to reconcile the two distributions appear rather oddly shaped, with
sections that are locally risk-loving rather than risk-averse.  Furthermore, the post-’87 Sharpe ratios
from writing put options or straddles seem extraordinarily high -- two to six times that of investing
directly in the stock market.2
1This is computed based upon the 1998 open interest for CBOE options on the S&P 100 and
S&P 500 indexes, and for CME options on S&P 500 futures.  It represents an upper limit in
assuming every option corresponds one-for-one to an underlying stock position.  Strategies
involving multiple options (vertical spreads, collars, straddles, etc.) would substantially reduce the
estimate of the stock positions being protected.
The overall industrial organization of the stock index option markets does not appear
especially compatible with the idealized construction of representative agents.  In that construction,
all individuals trade until at the margin they are indifferent to taking on more or less risk.  The
resultant risk-pooling of systematic risks across all agents permits the calibration of standard asset
pricing models from aggregate data sources: e.g., estimating the consumption CAPM based on
aggregate consumption data, or the CAPM based on proxies for the return on aggregate wealth.
However, most investors do not routinely use options to manage the underlying risks.  Although
stock index options are among the most actively traded options, the stock positions hedged by
exchange-traded options on the S&P index or futures represented at most 2.6% of the S&P 500
market capitalization in 1998.
1
In stock index option markets, individual investors can easily buy options but face obstacles
at the broker level to writing naked puts or calls.  While hard data are not readily available,
anecdotal evidence suggests a fundamental post-’87 dichotomy between the buyers and sellers in
the stock index option market.  A broad array of individual and institutional investors buy options
as part of their overall risk management strategies, while a relatively concentrated group of option
market makers predominantly write them and delta-hedge their positions.  And although all investors
need not be rational for markets to be efficient, this broad and apparently persistent dichotomy
between buyers and sellers suggests closer scrutiny of option market making is warranted.
The objective of this paper is therefore to focus more carefully on the financial intermedia-
tion of crash risk through option markets.  A general equilibrium model is constructed in which
relatively crash-tolerant option market makers insure crash-averse investors.  Heterogeneity in
attitudes towards crash risk is modeled via heterogeneous state-dependent utility functions similar
to those in Ho, Perraudin and Sørensen (1996).  Crashes can occur in the model, given occasional
adverse jumps in news about fundamentals.  Derivatives are consequently not redundant in the3
2Basak and Cuoco (1998) make a similar point regarding calibrations of the consumption
CAPM when most investors don’t hold stock.
3Froot (2001, Figure 3) illustrates the strong, temporary impacts of Hurricane Andrew in
1992 and the Northbridge earthquake in 1994 upon the price of catastrophe insurance.
model and serve the important function of dynamically completing the market.  Given complete
markets, equilibrium can be derived using an equivalent central planner’s problem, and the
corresponding dynamic trading strategies and market equilibria are identified.
The view of options markets as an insurance market for crash risk may be able to explain
some of the option pricing anomalies -- especially if there exist barriers to entry.  If crash risk is
concentrated among option market makers, calibrations based upon the risk-taking capacity of all
investors can be misleading.
2  Speculative opportunities such as writing straddles become
unappealing when the market makers are already overly involved in the business.  Furthermore, the
dynamic response of option prices to market drops resembles the price cycles observed in insurance
markets: an increase in the price of crash insurance caused by the contraction in market makers’
capital following losses.
3
This paper therefore represents an initial exploration of the financial intermediation of crash
risk via the options markets.  Section 1 recapitulates the various stylized facts from empirical options
research that the various models will attempt to match.  Section 2 introduces the basic framework,
and identifies a benchmark homogeneous-agent equilibrium.  Section 3 explores the implications
of heterogeneity in agents.  Section 4 concludes.4
4The puzzle is slightly exacerbated by the fact that at-the-money ISD’s are in principle
downwardly biased predictors of the (risk-neutral) volatility over the lifetime of the options.
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1. Empirical option pricing anomalies and stylized facts
Three categories of discrepancies between objective and risk-neutral measures will be kept in mind
in the theoretical section of the paper:  volatility, higher moments, and the implicit pricing kernel
that in principle reconciles the objective and risk-neutral probability measures.  Furthermore, each
category can be decomposed further into average discrepancies, and conditional discrepancies.
The unconditional volatility puzzle is that implicit standard deviations (ISD’s) from stock
index options have been higher on average over 1988-98 than realized volatility over the options’
lifetimes.  For instance, ISD’s from 30-day at-the-money put and call options on S&P 500 futures
have been 2% higher on average than the subsequent annualized daily volatility over the lifetime
of the options.
4   This discrepancy has generated substantial post-’87 profits on average from writing
at-the-money puts or straddles, with Sharpe ratios two to six times that of investing in the stock
market.  See, e.g., Fleming (1998) or Jackwerth (2000). 
The conditional volatility puzzle is that regressing realized volatility upon ISD’s generally
yields slopes that are significantly positive, but significantly less than one.  For instance, the
regressions using the 30-day ISD’s and realized volatilities mentioned above yield volatility and
variance results5
5Christensen and Prabhala (1998) argue that measurement error in ISD’s may be biasing
slope estimates downwards, and estimate essentially unitary slopes on post-’87 monthly data using
instrumental variables.  Using instrumental variables on my data had negligible effect on point
estimates.  However the associated loss of power did increase standard errors, to the point where
unbiasedness could not be rejected in some cases.  Jorion (1995) provides a Monte Carlo assessment
of measurement error’s impact on volatility regressions.
6In options research, implicit skewness is roughly measured by the shape of the volatility
“smirk,” or pattern of ISD’s across different strike prices (“moneyness”).  The skewness/maturity
interaction can be seen by examined by the volatility smirk at different horizons conditional upon
rescaling moneyness proportionately to the standard deviation appropriate at different horizons.  See,
Figure 1.  ISD’s and realized volatility, 1988-98.  ISD’s are from 30-
day S&P 500 futures options.  Realized volatility is annualized, from
daily log-differenced futures prices over the lifetime of the options.
with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
5  Since intercepts are small, the
regressions imply that ISD’s are especially poor forecasts of realized volatility when high.
The skewness puzzle is that the levels of skewness implicit in stock index options are
generally much larger in magnitude than those estimated from stock index returns -- whether from
unconditional returns (Jackwerth, 2000) or conditional upon a time series model that captures salient
features of time-varying distributions (Rosenberg and Engle, 2000).  Furthermore, implicit skewness
falls off only slightly for longer maturities of stock index options of, e.g., 3-6 months.
6  By contrast,6
e.g., Bates (2000, Figure 4).  Tompkins (2000) provides a comprehensive survey of volatility surface
patterns, including the maturity effects.
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Table 1
Implicit jump parameters, and (risk-neutral) cumulants at 1- and 6-month horizons, 
1988-98 estimates.
Average jump size:  -6.6%
Jump standard deviation: 11.0%
Jump intensity: λt ' 81.41 V1t % .01 V2t
1-month cumulants 
6-month cumulants
Average factor realizations:    .0092;   .0143. Avg(V1) ' Avg(V2) '
Conditional variance =  ; skewness  =  ; excess kurtosis =  . K2 K3/K
3/2
2 K4 / K
2
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the distribution of log-differenced stock indexes or stock index futures converges rapidly towards
near-normality as one progresses from daily to weekly to monthly holding periods.  
A further puzzle is the evolution of distributions implicit in option prices.  Figure 2 below
summarizes that evolution using updated estimates of the Bates (2000) 2-factor stochastic
volatility/jump-diffusion model with time-varying jump risk.  The affine structure of that model
permits a factor representation of implicit cumulants in terms of two underlying state variables.  The
first factor (V1) affects variance directly and also determines the jump intensity, thereby affecting
cumulants at all maturities.  The second factor (V2) influences instantaneous variance (with roughly7
Figure 2.  Implicit factor estimates from S&P 500 futures options, 1988-98.  
V1 affects all cumulants, at all maturities.  V2 affects conditional variance but has little
impact on higher cumulants.  Units are in instantaneous variance per year conditional on no
jumps (left scale), or in implicit jump frequency (right scale).  See Bates (2000) for
estimation details.
half the variance loading of V1 -- see Table 1 below), but has relatively little impact on higher
cumulants.  
The graph indicates that the sharp market declines over 1988-98 (in January 1988, October
1989, August 1990, November 1997, and August 1998) were accompanied by sharp increases in
implicit jump risk.  The puzzles here are the abruptness of the shifts (Bates (2000) rejects the
hypothesis that implicit jump risk follows an affine diffusion), and the magnitudes of implicit jump
risk achieved following the market declines.  Furthermore, affine models assume the risk-neutral and
objective jump intensity are proportional.  These models therefore imply objective crash risk is
highest immediately following crashes, which some (e.g., Chernov et al, 1999) would find
unappealing.8
7Jackwerth’s results are disputed by Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000), who find no anomalies when
comparing average option prices from 1993 with the unconditional return distribution estimated
from overlapping data from 1989-93.  The difference in results perhaps highlights the importance
of using conditional rather than unconditional distributions, as in Rosenberg and Engle (2000).  For
instance, both conditional variance and implicit standard deviations are time-varying; and a
substantial divergence between the two can produce anomalous implicit utility functions even in a
lognormal environment.
Finally, there is the implicit pricing kernel puzzle discussed in Jackwerth (2000) and
Rosenberg and Engle (2000).  The sharp discrepancy between the negatively skewed risk-neutral
distribution and roughly lognormal objective distribution at monthly horizons causes the risk-neutral
mode to be to the right of the estimated objective mode, even though the risk-neutral mean is
perforce to the left of the objective mean. If the level of the stock index is viewed as a reasonably
good proxy for overall wealth of the representative agent, this discrepancy in distributions implies
marginal utility of wealth is locally increasing in areas – implying utility functions that are locally
convex in areas, rather than globally concave.
7
It is possible that a standard representative agent/pricing kernel model can explain the above
puzzles.  Pan (2001), for instance, finds a substantial risk premium on time-varying jump risk is a
promising candidate.  The risk premium raises implicit jump risk, volatility, and skewness relative
to the values from the objective distribution, while the time variation in jump risk can explain the
conditional volatility bias.  Bates (2000) finds that this model can also match the maturity profile
of implicit skewness better than models with constant implicit jump risk. 
The challenges for this explanation are the magnitude of the speculative opportunities
associated with the implicit risk premia, and its failure to address the pricing kernel anomaly.  The
stochastic evolution of implicit and objective jump risk is also puzzling,9
dlnD ' µd dt % σddZ % γddN (3)
2. A jump-diffusion economy
I consider a simple continuous-time endowment economy over  , with a single terminal [0, T]
dividend payment   at time T.  News about this dividend (or, equivalently, about the terminal ˜ DT
value of the investment) arrives as a univariate Markov jump-diffusion of the form
where  Z is a standard Wiener process,
N is a Poisson counter with constant intensity  , and λ
 is a deterministic jump size or announcement effect, assumed negative. γd <0
Financial assets are claims on terminal outcomes.  Given the simple specification of news
arrival, any three non-redundant assets suffice to dynamically span this economy; e.g., bonds, stocks,
and a single long-maturity stock index option.  However, it is analytically more convenient to work
with the following three fundamental assets:
       1) a riskless numeraire bond in zero net supply that delivers one unit of terminal consumption
in all terminal states of nature;
       2) an equity claim in unitary supply that pays a terminal dividend   at time T, and is priced DT
at   at time t relative to the riskless asset; and St
       3) a jump insurance contract in zero net supply that costs an instantaneous and endogenously
determined insurance premium   and pays off 1 additional unit of the numeraire asset λ
(
t dt
conditional on a jump.  The terminal payoff of one insurance contract held to maturity is
. NT &
m
T
0
λ
(
t dt
Other assets such as options are redundant given these fundamental assets, and are priced by no
arbitrage given equilibrium prices for the latter two assets.  Equivalently, the jump insurance
contract can be synthesized from the short-maturity options markets with overlapping maturities that
we actually observe.  The equivalence between option and jump insurance contracts is discussed
below in section 3.5.
Agents are assumed to have crash-averse utility functions over terminal outcomes of the form10
8See Shefrin (1997) for an alternate model for pricing options under heterogeneous beliefs.
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where   is terminal wealth,   is the number of jumps over  , and   is a parameter of WT NT [0, T]Y > 0
crash aversion.  This generalization of power utility is the deterministic-jump equivalent of the
equilibrium pricing kernel specification in Ho, Perraudin, and Sørensen (1996), and has several
advantages.  First, as discussed in Ho et al and below, these preferences for a representative agent
facing independent and identically distributed returns imply constant risk-neutral jump intensities,
facilitating option pricing under the risk-neutral probability measure.  Indeed, the above utility
function can be derived as the entropy-minimizing pricing kernel that generates specific
instantaneous equity and jump risk premia given an i.i.d jump-diffusion process.
Second, these preferences retain the homogeneity of standard power utility, and the myopic
investment strategy property of the log utility subcase.  Third, investors with crash-averse
preferences ( ) use exaggerated certainty-equivalent crash frequency estimates when choosing Y >0
portfolio allocations, in a fashion potentially consistent with risk-neutral jump intensities inferred
from option prices:
An alternate interpretation is that   captures heterogeneous beliefs regarding the unknown Y
frequency of crashes.
8  However, this interpretation would require strong priors that preclude
investors from updating their subjective jump frequency   based on learning over time, or from λe Y
trading with other investors in the heterogeneous-agent equilibria derived below.11
ηtλ
(
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9A crash insurance with instantaneous cost   that pays off 1 unit of the numeraire λ
(
t dt
conditional upon a jump occurring in    is priced at (t, t% dt]
yielding the above expression.
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ηT ' UW(WT, NT) *WT ' DT
' D
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T e
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The above is a model of “external” crash aversion.  An alternate “internal” crash aversion
model could be constructed assuming investors’ aversion to crashes depends only on the degree to
which their own investments are directly affected:
where   is the jump in log wealth conditional upon a jump occurring, and conditional upon the γw
investor’s portfolio allocation. The major advantage to the external crash aversion in (4) is its
analytic tractability.  While it is possible to work out homogeneous-agent equilibria using internal
crash aversion, deriving heterogeneous-agent equilibria is trickier.  The difference in specifications
echoes the analytic advantages of external over internal habit formation models discussed in
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, p. 327-8).  
2.1 Equilibrium in a homogeneous-agent economy
The fundamental equations for pricing equity and crash insurance are
where   is a nonnegative pricing kernel.  The first two equations are standard; see, e.g., ηT /ηt
Grossman and Zhou (1996).  The last is derived in Bates (1988, 1991).
9  If all agents have identical
crash-averse preferences of the form given in (4) above, the pricing kernel can be derived from the
terminal marginal utility:12
Et e
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The following is useful for computing relevant conditional expectations.
Lemma: If   follows the jump-diffusion in (3) above and   is the underlying jump dt / ln Dt Nt
counter with intensity  , then  λ
Proof: There is a probability   of observing   jumps over  . wn ' e &λτ(λτ)n / n!n / NT & Nt (t, T]
Conditional upon n jumps,   for  , and ∆d / ln DT /Dt - N[µdτ % γd n, σ
2
dτ] τ / T & t
The last line follows from the independence of the Wiener and jump components, and from the
moment generating functions for Wiener and jump processes. O
Using the lemma and the pricing kernel (8) yields the following asset pricing equations:
The last equation implies that the price of equity relative to the riskless numeraire follows
roughly the same i.i.d. jump-diffusion process as the underlying dividend process, with identical
instantaneous volatility and jump magnitudes:
for  .  The instantaneous equity premium k ' e
γd & 113
log(λ(/λ) '& Rγd % Y . (16)
dS/S ' σd dZ ( % k (dN(& λ(dt) (17)
µ . .025R % .025Y
ln(λ(/λ) ' .10 R % Y
(18)
reflects required compensation for two types of risk.  First is the required compensation for stock
market variance from diffusion and jump components, roughly scaled by the coefficient of relative
risk aversion.  Second, the crash aversion parameter   increases the required excess return when Y $ 0
stock market jumps are negative.  
Crash aversion also directly affects the price of crash insurance relative to the actual arrival
rate of crashes:
Finally, derivatives are priced as if equity followed the risk-neutral martingale
where  is a jump counter with constant intensity  .  The resulting (forward) option prices are N ( λ(
identical to the deterministic-jump special case of Bates (1991), given the geometric jump-diffusion.
2.2 Consistency with empirical anomalies
The homogeneous crash aversion model can explain some of the stylized facts from section 1.  First,
unconditional bias in implied volatilities is explained by the potentially substantial divergence
between the risk-neutral instantaneous variance   implicit in option prices, and the actual σ2 % λ(γ
2
d
instantaneous variance   of log-differenced asset prices.  Second, the difference between   σ2 % λγ
2
d λ(
and   is consistent with the observation in Bates (2000, pp. 220-1) and Jackwerth (2000, pp. 446-7) λ
of too few observed jumps over 1988-98 relative to the number predicted by stock index options.
The extra parameter   permits greater divergence in   from   than is feasible under standard para- Y λ( λ
meterizations of power utility.
To illustrate this, consider the following calibration: a stock market volatility σ = 15%
annually conditional upon no jumps, and adverse dividend news of   that arrives on γd '& 10%
average once every four years ( ).  From equations (15) and (16), the equity premium and λ ' .25
crash insurance premium are14
v0 '
E0[ηtV(St)]
η0
' E0 V(St)
E0[ηt *St]
E0[ηt]
/ E0[V(St) M(St)],
(19)
For R = 1 and Y = 1, the equity premium is 5%/year, while the jump risk   implicit in option prices λ(
is three times that of the true jump risk.  Thus, the crash aversion parameter Y is roughly as
important as relative risk aversion for the equity premium, but substantially more important for the
crash premium.  Achieving the observed substantial disparity between   and λ  using risk aversion λ(
alone   would require levels of R that most would find unpalatable, and which would imply (Y ' 0)
an implausibly high equity premium.
Since returns are i.i.d. under both the actual and risk-neutral distribution, the homogeneous-
agent model is not capable of capturing the dynamic anomalies discussed in section 1.  The standard
results from regressing realized on implicit variance cannot be replicated here, because neither is
time-varying in this model.  Were there a time-varying volatility component in the dividend news
process, however, the difference between   and   would affect the intercept from such regressions λ( λ
but could not explain why the slope estimate is less than 1.  Second, the model cannot match the
observed tendency of    to jump contemporaneously with substantial market drops.  Finally, the λ
(
t
i.i.d. return structure implies that implicit distributions should rapidly converge towards
lognormality at longer maturities -- which does not accord with the maturity profile of the volatility
smirk.
Furthermore, Jackwerth’s (2000) anomaly cannot be replicated under homogeneous crash
aversion.  As discussed in Rosenberg and Engle (2000), Jackwerth’s implicit pricing kernel involves
the projection of the actual pricing kernel upon asset payoffs.  E.g., stock index options with
terminal payoff   have an initial price V(St)
where   has the usual properties of pricing kernels: it is nonnegative, and  .   M(St) E0[M(St)] ' 1
It is shown in the appendix that for crash-averse preferences, this projection takes the form15
M(St) ' κ(t) S
&R
t
p St *λe Y
p(St *λ)
(20)
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Figure 3.  Log of the implicit pricing kernel conditional upon
realized returns.  Calibration:  t ' 1/12, σd ' .15, R ' Y ' 1,
. γd '& .10, λ ' .25
where   is a function of time and   is the probability density function of   conditional κ(t) p(St * λ) St
upon a jump intensity of   over (0, t).  Implicit relative risk aversion is given by  . λ &MlnM(S)/MlnS
For  , one observes the strictly decreasing pricing kernel and constant relative risk aversion Y ' 0
associated with power utility.  For  , it is proven in the appendix that   is a strictly Y >0 l nM(St)
decreasing function of   that is illustrated below in Figure 3.  Thus, this pricing kernel cannot ln St
replicate the negative implicit risk aversion (positive slope) estimated by Jackwerth (2000) and
Rosenberg and Engle (2000) for some values of  .  However, crash-averse preferences can replicate St
the higher implicit risk aversion (steeper negative slope) for low   values that was estimated by ln St
those authors and by Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000).
Jackwerth (2000, p.446) conjectures that the negative risk aversion estimate may be
attributable to investors overestimating the crash risk relative to the observed ex post crash
frequency.  Within this model, such overestimation is equivalent to a positive value of  , and cannot Y
generate the required divergences between objective and risk-neutral distributions.  In equilibrium
the equity premium (15) is also positively affected by Y, shifting the mode of the objective
           ln M(St)
 ln(St/S0)16
λ(dt & Et[1*dN' 1]
Vart[1*dN' 1]
' (λ( & λ)dt
λdt (1 & λdt)
' λ(
λ
& 1
(21)
distribution sufficiently to the right to preclude observing Jackwerth’s anomaly.  Of course, there
could still be an anomalous disparity between the risk-neutral distribution and the estimate of the
objective distribution.
Jackwerth’s exploration of whether the divergence between the risk-neutral and estimated
objective distributions is implausibly profitable is a separate issue.  Within this framework, crash
aversion can generate investment opportunities with high Sharpe ratios.  For instance, the
instantaneous Sharpe ratio on writing crash insurance is
which can be substantially larger than the instantaneous Sharpe ratio   on equity given µ/ σ2 % λk 2
investors’ aversion to this type of risk.  The put selling strategies examined in Jackwerth implicitly
involve a portfolio that is instantaneously long equity and short crash insurance.  Since adding a high
Sharpe ratio investment to a market investment must raise instantaneous Sharpe ratios, this model
is consistent with the substantial profitability of option-writing strategies reported in Jackwerth
(2000) and elsewhere.17
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3. Equilibrium in a heterogeneous-agent economy
As this model is dynamically complete, equilibrium in the heterogeneous-agent case can be
identified by examining an equivalent central planner’s problem in weighted utility functions.  The
solution to that problem is Pareto-optimal, and can be attained by a competitive equilibrium for
traded assets in which all investors willingly hold market-clearing optimal portfolios given
equilibrium asset price evolution.  Section 3.1 below outlines the central planner’s problem, while
Section 3.2 discusses the resulting asset market equilibrium. Section 3.3 identifies the supporting
individual wealth evolutions and associated portfolio allocations, and confirms the optimality of the
equilibrium. Section 3.4 discusses the implications for option prices, while Section 3.5 compares
the equilibrium with the stylized facts discussed above in Section 1.
3.1 The central planner’s problem
Under homogeneous beliefs about state probabilities, the central planner’s problem of maximizing
a weighted average of expected state-dependent utilities is equivalent to constructing a representa-
tive state-dependent utility function in terminal wealth (Constantinides 1982, Lemma 2):
for fixed weights   that depend upon the initial wealth allocation in a fashion determined ω / {ωY}
below in Section 3.3.  Since the individual marginal utility functions    at UW(WYT, NT; Y) '% 4
 and the horizon is finite, the individual no-bankruptcy constraints   are non-binding WYT' 0 WYT $ 0
and can be ignored. Optimizing the Lagrangian
yields a terminal state-dependent wealth allocation
and a Lagrangian multiplier18
ηT ' W
&R
T j
Y
ωY f Y(NT)
1
R
R
/ W
&R
T f (NT; ω)
(25)
UW(WYT, NT; Y) '
ηT
ωY
. (26)
g(Nt, t; λN) / Et f(Nt % ˜ n) * λN
' j
n
e &λN(T & t)[λN(T & t)]n
n!
f(Nt % n)
(27)
ηt ' e
κη(T & t) D
&R
t g Nt, t, λe
&Rγd (28)
St
Dt
' e
κS(T&t) g Nt, t, λe
(1&R)γd
g Nt, t, λe
&Rγd
/ e
κS(T&t) m(Nt, t)
(29)
λ((Nt, t) ' λe
&Rγd g Nt% 1,t, λe
&Rγd
g Nt, t, λe
&Rγd (30)
where   is a CES-weighted average of individual crash aversion functions  ’s.   The Lagrangian ff Y
multiplier   is the shadow value of terminal wealth, and therefore determines ηT ' UW(WT, NT; ω)
the pricing kernel when evaluated at  .  From the first-order condition to (23), all individual WT ' DT
terminal marginal utilities of wealth are directly proportional to the multiplier:
3. 2 Asset market equilibrium
As in equations (7) above, the pricing kernel   can be used to price all assets.  That  asset ηT /ηt
market equilibrium depends critically upon expectations of average crash aversion.  Define
as the conditional expectation of   given jump intensity   over  for future jumps f(NT) λN (t, T ]
.  It is shown in the appendix that the resulting asset pricing equations are ˜ n / NT & Nt
where ,  κη '& Rµd % ½R 2σ
2
d % λ(e
&Rγd & 1)
and . κS ' µd % (½ & R)σ
2
d % λe
&Rγd(e
γd & 1)19
dS
S
' µ(Nt, t)dt % σddZ % k(Nt, t)( dN & λdt) (31)
µ(Nt ,t) '& Et
dS
S
dη
η
' Rσ
2
d % [λ & λ((Nt, t)]k(Nt, t)
(32)
dS
S
' σd dZ % k(N
(
t , t)[dN( & λ
(
t dt] (34)
πYt /
ωY exp[YNt % λe
&γd(T&t)(e Y & 1)]
j
Y
ωY exp[YNt % λe
&γd(T&t)(e Y & 1)]
(35)
1% k(Nt, t) ' e
γd m[Nt % 1, t]
m[Nt, t] (33)
The equilibrium equity price follows a jump-diffusion of the form
where
and
for  defined above in equation (29).  The risk-neutral price process follows a martingale of m[N, t]
the form
for   a risk-neutral jump counter with instantaneous jump intensity  , the functional form N ( λ
(
t (N
(
t , t)
of which is given above in equation (30). 
Several features of the equilibrium are worth emphasizing.  First, conditional upon no jumps
the asset price follows a diffusion similar to   -- i.e., with identical and constant instantaneous Dt
volatility  .  This property reflects the assumption of common relative risk aversion R, and would σd
not hold in general under alternate utility specifications or heterogeneous risk aversion.  A further
implication discussed below is that all investors hold identical equity positions.
Second, the equilibrium price process and crash insurance premium depend critically upon
the heterogeneity of agents.   This is simplest to illustrate in the unitary risk aversion case, for which
equilibrium values can be expressed directly in terms of the weighted distribution of individual crash
aversions.  Define pseudo-probabilities20
ln(λ
(
t /λ) '& Rγd % ln ECS e Y
. &Rγd % ECS Y % ½VarCS[Y]
(36)
ln(St /Dt)
T& t
'& κs % ln ECS e Φ(e Y&1) * Φ ' λ(T& t)e
&γd(e
γd&1)
. µd & (R&½)σ
2
d % λe
&γdECS e Y (e
γd&1)
(37)
ln(1% kt) . γd 1 % λe
&γd(T & t)CovCS Y, e Y . (38)
as the weight assigned to investors of type   at time t, and define cross-sectional average  , YE CS(C)
variance  , and covariance with respect to those weights.  It is shown in the appendix that VarCS(C)
the asset market equilibrium takes the form
To a first-order approximation, jump insurance premia in (36) and equity prices in (37)
replicate the homogeneous-agent equilibria, using average values for Y and  , respectively. e Y
However, heterogeneity introduces second- and higher-order effects, as well, depending upon the
dispersion of agents.  In particular, the size of log equity jumps   in (33) and (38) can be ln(1% kt)
substantially magnified relative to the dividend signal   when there is substantial heterogeneity in γd
agents.
Figure 4 below illustrates these impacts in the case of only two types of agents, conditional
upon the initial wealth distribution and its impact on social weights   (given below in equation ω
(41)) and conditional upon an adverse dividend shock  .  The impact of small dividend γd '& .03
announcements upon jumps in log equity prices is greatest in the central areas of wealth distribution.
The substantial  divergence of preferences in the center implies greater trading of crash insurance,
and more substantial wealth redistribution and shifts in the investment opportunity set conditional
upon a jump.  The result is that a modest 3% drop in the dividend signal can induce a 3% to 18%
drop in the log price of equity!  As indicated in Table 2 below, this magnification is also present for
alternate values of the risk aversion parameter R.21
Table 2.  Average log jump size   conditional upon initial wealth allocation ln(1% kt)
 and risk aversion R.  Calibration:  ,  ,  ,  . w1 ' W1(0) /W(0) σ ' .20 λ ' .25 γd '& .03 T ' 50
       given: ln(1% kt) R
           .5 1 2 4 8 w1
 0
 .0001
 .001
 .01
 .1
 .2
 .3
 .4
 .5
 .6
 .7
 .8
 .9
 .99
 .999
1
-.030
-.030
-.032
-.052
-.157
-.189
-.187
-.171
-.149
-.125
-.101
-.076
-.053
-.032
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.032
-.045
-.136
-.178
-.189
-.183
-.166
-.144
-.118
-.090
-.060
-.033
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.036
-.090
-.135
-.163
-.177
-.178
-.169
-.149
-.119
-.079
-.035
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.031
-.044
-.061
-.079
-.097
-.114
-.128
-.135
-.129
-.096
-.035
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.030
-.034
-.038
-.043
-.048
-.053
-.059
-.066
-.072
-.065
-.033
-.030
-.030
The crash insurance rate   is always between the   value of the crash-tolerant λ
(
t λe
&Rγd
investors ( ), and the   value of the crash-averse investors.  Its value depends Y ' 0 λe
Y & Rγd
monotonically upon the relative weights of the two types of investors, and is biased upward relative
to the wealth-weighted average by the variance term in equation (36).  The equity premium   varies µ
somewhat with the magnitude of crash risk, in a non-monotonic fashion.
A final observation is that the asset market equilibrium depends upon the number of jumps
, and is consequently nonstationary.  This is an almost unavoidable feature of equilibrium models Nt
with a fixed number of heterogeneous agents.  Heterogeneity implies agents have different portfolio
allocations, implying their relative wealth weights and the resulting asset market equilibrium depend22
10See Dumas (1989) and Wang (1996) for examples of the predominantly nonstationary
impact of heterogeneity in a diffusion context.  An interesting exception is Chen and Kogan (2001),
who show that external habit formation preferences can induce stationarity in an exchange economy
with heterogeneous agents.
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Figure 4: Impact of initial relative wealth share   upon initial w1 ' W1(0) /W(0)
equilibrium quantities.  Two agents, with crash aversion  , respectively.  Calibration: Y ' 0, 1
, ,  ;  . σ ' .20 λ ' .25 γd '& .03 R ' 1, T ' 50, t ' 0
Log jump size  Crash premium  ln(1 % kt) λ
(
t /λ
Equity premium µt ' Rσ2 % (λ & λ
(
t )kt
upon the nonstationary outcome of asset price evolution.
10  In this model, the number of jumps Nt
and time t are proxies for wealth distribution.  Crashes redistribute wealth towards the more crash-
averse, making the representative agent more crash-averse.  An absence of crashes has the opposite
effect through the payment of crash insurance premia.23
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3.3 Supporting wealth evolution and portfolio choice
An investor’s wealth at any time t can be viewed as the value (or cost) of a contingent claim that
pays off the investor’s share of terminal wealth   conditional upon the number of jumps: WT ' DT
see equation (A.16) in the appendix for details.  The quantity   is the current share of wY(Nt, t; ω)
current total wealth  , and appropriately sums to 1 across all investors.  The weights   of W(t) ' St ω
the social utility function are implicitly identified up to an arbitrary factor of proportionality by the
initial wealth distribution:
for  .  In the   case the mapping between   and the initial wealth κ / E0 f(NT; ω) * λe
(1&R)γd R'1 ω
distribution is explicit, and takes the form
The investment strategy that dynamically replicates the evolution of   can be identified WY(t)
using positions in equity and crash insurance that mimic the diffusion- and jump-contingent
evolution: 24
XY '
MWY(St,Nt, t)
MS
' wY(Nt, t; ω)
QY ' [∆WY & NS∆S]dN ' 1
' S(1% kt)[wY(Nt %1, t, ω) & wY(Nt, t, ω)].
(42)
qY(t) /
QY(t)
WY(t)
' (1 % kt)
wY(Nt%1, t; ω)
wY(Nt, t; ω)
& 1. (43)
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Figure 5.  Equilibrium crash insurance positions and
aggregate demand for crash insurance, as a function of
.  Calibration is the same as in Figure 4. w1 ' W1(0)/W(0)
  Crash-averse investors’q1
Total demand w1q1
                   w1
Crash-tolerant investors’q0
where   is the percentage jump size in the equity price given above in equations (33) and kt ' k(Nt, t)
(38).  Thus, each investor holds   shares of equity (i.e., is 100% invested in equity), XY ' WY(t)/St
and holds a relative crash insurance position of
The wealth-weighted aggregate crash insurance positions   appropriately sum jY wY(Nt, t; ω) qY(t)
to 0.
Figure 5 below graphs the individual crash insurance demands   given crash aversions (q0, q1)
 and 1, respectively, conditional upon the initial wealth allocation  and its Y ' 0 w1 ' W1(0) /W(0)25
11Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Campbell, Rodriguez and Viceira (2001) find substantial
hedging against stochastic shifts in expected returns, while Chacko and Viceira (1999) find little
hedging against stochastic volatility.  The two approaches diverge in the specification and
calibration of shifts in the investment opportunity set.
impact upon equilibrium  .  The aggregate demand for crash insurance   is also graphed, (λ
(
t , kt) w1q1
using the same calibration as in Figure 4 above.  At  , crash-tolerant investors   set a w1 ' 0( Y ' 0)
relatively low market-clearing price   and sell little insurance.  Crash-averse investors λ
(
t ' λe
&γd
 insure heavily individually, but are a negligible fraction of the market.  As   increases,  (Y ' 1) w1 λ
(
t
does as well (see Figure 4 above) and the crash insurance positions of both investors decline.
Aggregate crash insurance volumes are heaviest in the central regions where both types of investors
are well represented.  As   approaches 1, the high price of crash insurance induces crash-tolerant w1
investors to write contracts that will cost them 60% of their wealth conditional upon a crash. 
3.3.1 Optimality
The individual’s investment strategy yields a terminal wealth , and an associated terminal WYT
marginal utility of wealth   that (from equation (26)) is proportional to the UW(WYT, NT; Y)
Lagrangian multiplier    that prices all assets.  Therefore, no investor has an incentive to perturb ηT
his investment strategy given equilibrium asset prices and price processes.  Furthermore, as noted
above, the markets for equity and crash insurance clear, so the markets are in equilibrium.   Since
all individual state-dependent marginal utilities are proportional at expiration, the market is
effectively complete.  All investors agree on the price of all Arrow-Debreu securities, so their
introduction would not affect the equilibrium. 
3.3.2 Comparison with myopic investment strategies
The equilibrium asset price evolution in Section 3.2 involves considerable and stochastic evolution
over time of the instantaneous investment opportunity set.  Since Merton (1973), hedging against
such shifts has been identified as the key distinction between static and dynamic asset market
equilibria.  As there are conflicting results even in a diffusion setting as to the quantitative
importance of such hedging,
11 and as there has been little exploration of the issue in a jump-diffusion
context, a comparison with the myopic investment strategies characteristic of static equilibria may26
J(Wt, Nt, t) / max Et e
YNT W
1& R
T & 1
1 & R
(44)
dS/S ' µdt % σdZ % k(dN & λdt).
x myopic ' 1
Rσ2 µ % (λ( & λ)k
q myopic ' λe Y
λ(
1
R & (1 % w (k)
(46)
be useful.  Furthermore, myopic strategies are optimal when investors have unitary risk aversion
( ), or when returns are i.i.d. -- e.g., in the case of investor homogeneity. R ' 1
 
The myopic portfolio allocation is defined as the position that maximizes terminal expected
utility
conditional upon assuming instantaneous investment opportunities will remain unchanged at the
current level over the investor’s lifetime.  Those opportunities are summarized by the instantaneous
cost of crash insurance  , and the price process  λ(
No assumption are made at this stage regarding the values of  . (µ, k, λ()
It is shown in the appendix that the myopic investor will choose constant portfolio proportions
where   is the portfolio share in equity, and x / St X/W
 is the number of insurance contracts as a fraction of overall wealth. q / Q/W
If investors are homogeneous, the market-clearing conditions   yield the (x myopic, q myopic) ' (1, 0)
equilibrium and time-invariant   given above in equations (11) and (15).  The above myopic (µ, λ()
portfolio weights are also optimal under time-varying   when  , but not for general (µt, kt, λ
(
t ) R ' 1
R.
The myopic portfolio allocation equations (46) indicate that equity and crash insurance are
complements when jumps are negative ( ).  An  increase in the price of crash insurance  k <0 λ(
lowers the demand for both equity and crash insurance, while an increase in the expected excess
return   on equity raises both.   The equations also indicate that myopic crash insurance positions µ27
but not equity positions are directly affected by the investor’s idiosyncratic crash aversion parameter
.  Furthermore, at the equilibrium equity premium (32), myopic investors duplicate the optimal Y
investment strategy of holding 100% in equity, and diverge from that optimum only in their holdings
of crash insurance.
Table 3 compares the optimal and myopic crash insurance strategies at the equilibrium values
for    resulting from various initial wealth allocations and risk aversion.  The two strategies (kt, λ
(
t )
are broadly similar across different asset market equilibria, and are identical either when risk
aversion  , or when a preponderance of one type of individual (  = 0 or 1) yields a R ' 1 W1(t)/W(t)
homogeneous-agent equilibrium with a time-invariant investment opportunity set. 
The table indicates that a myopic strategy can be a poor approximation to the optimal
strategy in other cases.  The divergence is most pronounced for the large positions achieved under
low levels of risk aversion  , but is also present for larger R values.  For instance, when (R ' ½)
crash-tolerant and crash-averse investors are equally represented (  = ½) and R = 2, a 3% W1 / W
adverse dividend shock will induce a 17.8% stock market crash (from Table 2).  The crash-averse
buy crash insurance contracts from the crash-tolerant that pay off 36.5% of current wealth
conditional on a crash.  The myopic positions   = (-16.9%, 26.4%) in Table 3 (q
myopic
0 , q
myopic
1 )
substantially understate the magnitude of those optimal insurance positions.28
Table 3.  Optimal and myopic crash insurance positions, at equilibrium asset prices determined by
idiosyncratic crash aversions  , initial wealth allocation  , and common risk Y ' 0, 1 w1 ' W1(0) /W(0)
aversion R.  Equilibrium values for   and parameter values are in Table 2 above.  Entries indicate ln(1% kt)
the payoff of insurance positions conditional on a crash, as a fraction of investor’s wealth.
w1
Crash aversion  ; R = Crash aversion  ; R = Y ' 0 Y ' 1
0 . 5 1248 0 . 5 1248
Optimal positions q
(
Y
0.0
.0001
.001
.01
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.99
.999
1.0
 .000
 .000
-.002
-.017
-.128
-.215
-.285
-.347
-.402
-.452
-.499
-.542
-.584
-.629
-.651
-.839
 .000
 .000
-.002
-.016
-.128
-.214
-.282
-.339
-.391
-.440
-.485
-.529
-.572
-.609
-.613
-.613
 .000
 .000
-.001
-.011
-.119
-.205
-.270
-.321
-.365
-.405
-.444
-.482
-.518
-.497
-.418
-.382
 .000
 .000
 .000
-.003
-.062
-.140
-.204
-.255
-.293
-.322
-.341
-.352
-.345
-.241
-.217
-.215
 .000
 .000
 .000
-.001
-.017
-.045
-.080
-.115
-.145
-.166
-.177
-.175
-.153
-.118
-.114
-.114
6.200
1.852
1.773
1.648
1.148
 .858
 .666
 .520
 .402
 .301
 .214
 .136
 .065
 .006
 .001
 .000
1.667
1.667
1.660
1.598
1.152
 .856
 .657
 .509
 .391
 .293
 .208
 .132
 .064
 .006
 .001
 .000
 .630
 .652
 .793
1.134
1.069
 .822
 .629
 .482
 .365
 .270
 .190
 .121
 .058
 .005
 .000
 .000
.276
.276
.277
.299
.557
.559
.477
.382
.293
.214
.146
.088
.038
.002
.000
.000
.129
.129
.129
.131
.152
.179
.187
.173
.145
.111
.076
.044
.017
.001
.000
.000
Myopic positions q
myopic
Y
0.0
.0001
.001
.01
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.99
.999
1.0
 .000
 .000
-.004
-.041
-.284
-.429
-.522
-.592
-.648
-.695
-.737
-.774
-.808
-.836
-.839
-.839
 .000
 .000
-.002
-.016
-.128
-.214
-.282
-.339
-.391
-.440
-.485
-.529
-.572
-.609
-.613
-.613
 .000
 .000
-.001
-.007
-.056
-.091
-.117
-.142
-.169
-.199
-.234
-.275
-.324
-.376
-.381
-.382
 .000
 .000
 .000
-.002
-.028
-.051
-.066
-.073
-.077
-.080
-.087
-.103
-.142
-.209
-.214
-.215
 .000
 .000
 .000
-.001
-.010
-.021
-.032
-.041
-.048
-.053
-.055
-.058
-.072
-.110
-.114
-.114
6.200
6.195
6.153
5.764
3.362
2.122
1.440
1.012
 .717
 .501
 .334
 .201
 .092
 .008
 .001
 .000
1.667
1.667
1.660
1.598
1.152
 .856
 .657
 .509
 .391
 .293
 .208
 .132
 .064
 .006
 .001
 .000
.630
.629
.628
.615
.500
.418
.358
.309
.264
.220
.173
.122
.065
.007
.001
.000
.276
.276
.275
.272
.236
.201
.178
.164
.154
.147
.137
.117
.075
.006
.001
.000
.129
.129
.129
.128
.117
.104
.091
.080
.071
.066
.062
.058
.043
.004
.000
.00029
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3.4 Option markets
3.4.1 Option prices
At time 0, European call options of maturity   are priced at expected terminal value weighted by t
the pricing kernel:
Conditional upon   jumps over  ,  and   have a joint lognormal distribution that reflects Nt (0, t] ηt St
their common dependency on   given above in equations (28) and (29).  Consequently, it is shown Dt
in the appendix that the risk-neutral distribution for   is a weighted mixture of lognormals, St
implying European call option prices are a weighted average of Black-Scholes-Merton prices:
where , λN/λe
&R γd
, w
(
N / e &λNt(λNt)N
N!
g(N, t; λN)
g(0, 0; λN)
, bN '& λN(e
γd & 1) % nγd % ln [m(N,t)/m(0,0)] /t
 and  d1N ' [ln(S0 /X ) % bN t % ½σ
2
dt]/σd t
. d2N ' d1N & σd t
Put prices can be computed from call prices using put-call parity:
Since jumps are always negative, the distribution of log-differenced equity prices implicit
in option prices is always negatively skewed.  The maturity profile of implicit skewness is quite
sensitive to the initial distribution of wealth, given the nonmonotonic dependency of   on ln(1% kt)
wealth distribution shown above in Table 2 and Figure 4.  For small values of  , a second jump w1
will be larger than the first.  The increasing probability of multiple jumps at longer maturities causes
implicit skewness to fall slower than the   rate of i.i.d. returns, implying slower flattening out 1/ t30
12Tompkins examines implicit volatility patterns from various countries’ futures options on
currency, stock index, bonds and interest rates, with the moneyness dimension appropriately scaled
by maturity-specific volatility estimates from at-the-money options.  He finds some maturity
variation in implicit volatility patterns, but not much by comparison with the strong inverse pattern
predicted by i.i.d. returns.
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Figure 6.  Annualized risk-neutral skewness
, as a function of t. Skew[t]× t
w1 ' .8
w1 ' .1
of the implicit volatility smirk.  For larger values of   the size of sequential jump sizes is reversed, w1
and implicit skewness can fall faster than the   rate of i.i.d. returns; see Figure 6.  1/ t
However, model-specific estimates from option prices such as in Table 1 above indicate that
implicit   (rather than  ) is roughly flat across option maturities t.  This stylized Skew[t] Skew[t]× t
fact appears common to a broad array of futures options, as indicated in the Tompkins (2000) survey
of volatility smiles and smirks.
12  Thus, although Bates (2000) argues that stochastic implicit jump
intensities   are needed to match the volatility smirk at longer maturities, it does not appear that λ
(
t
the  stochastic variation of   in this model generates the correct maturity profile of implicit (λ
(
t , kt)
skewness.
3.4.1 Option replication and dynamic completion of the markets
Options can be dynamically replicated using positions in equity and crash insurance.  Instanta-
neously, each call option has a price  , and can be viewed as an instantaneous bundle of  c(St, Nt, t) cS
units of equity risk, and   units of crash insurance.   [∆c & cS∆S]dN ' 1 >031
13As indicated above in Figure 4, the total volume (open interest) in crash insurance and
therefore in options can either rise or fall as the wealth distribution varies.
This equivalence between options and crash insurance indicates how investors replicate the
optimal positions of section 3.3 dynamically using the call and/or put options actually available.
Crash-averse investors choose an equity/options bundle with unitary delta overall and positive
gamma (e.g., hold 1½ stocks and buy one at-the-money put option), while crash-tolerant investors
take offsetting positions that also possess unitary delta (e.g., hold ½ stock, and write 1 put option).
Equity and option positions are adjusted in a mutually acceptable and offsetting fashion over time,
conditional upon the arrival of dividend news.  
A further implication is that the crash-tolerant investors who write options actively delta-
hedge their exposure, which is consistent with the observed practice of option market makers.   As λ
(
t / λ
increases (e.g., because of wealth transfers to the crash-averse from crashes) , the market makers
respond to the more favorable prices by writing more options as a proportion of their wealth.
13  They
simultaneously adjust their equity positions to maintain their overall target delta of 1.  This strategy
is equivalent to market makers putting their personal wealth in an index fund, and fully delta-
hedging every index option they write.
3.5 Consistency with empirical option pricing anomalies
The heterogeneous-agent model explains unconditional deviations between risk-neutral and
objective distributions analogously to the homogeneous-agent model.  The divergence in the jump
intensity   implicit in options and the true jump frequency   can reconcile the average divergence λ
(
t λ
between risk-neutral and objective variance, and between the predicted and observed frequency of
jumps over 1988-98.  The heterogeneous-agent model can also be somewhat more consistent with
the maturity profile of implicit skewness than the homogeneous-agent model, although still appears
inadequate relative to observed patterns.
The advantage of the heterogeneous-agent model is that it can explain some of the
conditional divergences as well.  First, the stochastic evolution of   is qualitatively consistent with λ
(
t
the evolution of jump intensity proxy V1 shown above in Figure 2.    depends directly upon the λ
(
t32
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Figure 7.  Simulated instantaneous risk-neutral variance
 conditional upon jump timing matching that Rσ2 % λ
(
t γ
2
t
observed over 1988-98.  Calibration: ;  i.e., w1(0) ' 10%
crash-averse investors own 10% of total wealth at end-
1987.
relative wealth distribution, which in turn follows a pure jump process given above in (40) for the R ' 1
case.  Consequently, market jumps cause sharp increases in  , while an absence of jumps generates λ
(
t
geometric decay in   towards the lower level of crash-tolerant investors.   λ
(
t
Figure 7 below illustrates the resulting evolution of instantaneous risk-neutral variance
()   conditional on the five major shocks over 1988-98, and conditional on starting with Rσ2 % λ
(
t γ
2
t
 = .1 at end-1987.  This behavior is qualitatively similar to the actual impact of jumps on overall w1
variance and on jump risk shown above in Figure 2.  However, the absence of major shocks over
1992-96 and the resulting wealth accumulation by crash-tolerant investors/option market makers
implies that the shocks of 1997 and 1998 should not have had the major impact that was in fact
observed.
It is possible the heterogeneous model can explain the results from ISD regressions as well.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that instantaneous objective and risk-neutral variance are
nonstationary, with a nonlinear cointegrating relationship from their common dependency on the
 nonstationary variable  : Nt33
Vart[dlnS] ' [σ2 % λγ
2
t ] dt
Var
(
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2
t ] dt
(50)
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Figure 8.  Log of the implicit pricing kernel
conditional upon realized asset returns. 
Calibration: . w1 ' .3, t ' 1/12
   lnE0[ηt * ∆st]
       ∆st
M(St) /
E0[ηt*St]
η0
' κS
&R
t
j
4
N' 0 w
((
N p(St * N)
p(St)
where
wN ' e &λt(λt)N
N!
, w
((
N '
wN m(N, t)R g N, t, λe
(1&R )γd
j
4
N' 0 wN m(N, t)R g N, t, λe
(1&R )γd
.
(51)
for  and  .  It is not immediately clear whether regressing realized on γt / ln[1% k(Nt, t)] λ
(
t > λ
implied volatility is meaningful under nonlinear cointegration.  However, the fact that implicit
variance does contain information for objective variance but is biased upwards suggests that running
this sort of regression on post-’87 data would yield the usual informative-but-biased results reported
above in equation (2), with estimated slope coefficients less than 1 in sample.
It does not appear that the heterogeneous-agent model can explain the implicit pricing kernel
puzzle.  Using the same projection as in (19) above , the projected pricing kernel is
As illustrated in Figure 8, this implicit pricing kernel appears to be a strictly decreasing function of St
-- in contrast to the locally positive sections estimated in Jackwerth (2000) and Rosenberg and Engle
(2000).  However, the above implicit kernel can replicate those studies’ high implicit risk aversion34
for large negative returns, as indicated by the slope of the line in Figure 8 for   in the -10% to ∆s
-20% ranges.
4. Summary and conclusions
This paper has proposed a modified utility specification, labeled “crash aversion,” to explain the
observed tendency of post-’87 stock index options to overpredict realized volatility and jump risk.
Furthermore, the paper has developed a complete-markets methodology that permits identification
of asset market equilibria and associated investment strategies in the presence of jumps and investor
heterogeneity.  The assumption of heterogeneity appears to have stronger consequences than
observed with diffusion models.  Jumps can cause substantial reallocation of wealth, and the
resulting shifts in the investment opportunity set can be substantial. Small announcement effects
regarding the terminal value of the market can have substantially magnified instantaneous price
impacts when investors are heterogeneous.
The model has been successful in explaining some of the stylized facts from stock index
options markets.  The specification of crash aversion is compatible with the tendency of option
prices to overpredict volatility and jump risk, while heterogeneity of agents offers an explanation
of the stochastic evolution of implicit jump risk and implicit volatilities.  In this model, the two are
higher immediately after market drops not because of higher objective risk of future jumps (as
predicted by affine models), but because crash-related wealth redistribution has increased average
crash aversion.  Crash aversion is also consistent with the implicit pricing kernel approach’s
assessment of high implicit risk aversion at low wealth levels, although the approach cannot
replicate the locally risk-loving behavior reported in Jackwerth (2000) and Rosenberg and Engle
(2000).
While motivated by empirical option price regularities, the model in the paper is not suitable
for direct estimation.  First, jump risk is not the only risk spanned in the options markets.  Stochastic
variations in conditional volatility occur more frequently, and are also important to option market
makers.  Second, the nonstationary equilibrium derived here and characteristic of most
heterogeneous-agent models hinders estimation.  The purpose of the paper is to provide a framework35
for exploring the trading of jump risk through the options markets, as an initial model of the option
market making process.
The framework in this paper can be expanded in various ways.  For simplicity, this paper has
focused on deterministic jumps and an “external” crash aversion specification insensitive to the
impact of crashes upon individual wealth.  Extending the model to random jumps and/or “internal”
crash aversion should be relatively straightforward, although feedback effects in the latter case could
require additional restrictions to achieve an equilibrium.  A particularly interesting extension could
be to explore the implications of portfolio constraints on positions in options and/or jump insurance.
Selling crash insurance requires writing calls or puts -- a strategy that individual investors cannot
easily pursue.  Further research will examine the impact of such constraints upon equilibria in equity
and options markets.36
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Appendix
Section A.1 of the appendix prices assets when agents are heterogeneous. Section A.2 derives the
myopic investment strategies.  Section A.3 derives the objective and risk-neutral probability density
functions under heterogeneity.  Section A.4 derives properties of the implicit pricing kernel under
homogeneous and heterogeneous agents.
A.1 Asset market equilibrium in a heterogeneous-agent economy (Section 3.2)
Lemma:  If the log-dividend    follows the jump-diffusion given above in equation (3) and dt / ln Dt
 is an arbitrary function, then  h(NT)
where  denotes expectations conditional upon a jump intensity   over  . Et[C*λ] λ (t, T ]
Proof:
where .     τ / T & t
The asset pricing equations (28)-(30) follow directly from the lemma:37
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Using (A.6) for g, the equity pricing equation (A.4) becomes38
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for the cross-sectional expectation   defined with regard to probabilities (A.7), and for ECS(C)
.  From (A.5), the jump risk premium has a similar Φ / (λO & λN)(T & t) ' λe
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representation:
The approximation for the log jump size follows from the following approximations:
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while the cross-derivative is
Consequently (from (A.11)),
Section 3.3, equation (39)
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A.2 Myopic portfolio choice (Section 3.3.2)
The myopic portfolio allocation strategy   in equity and crash insurance maximizes the (x, q)
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
under the assumption of constant  , and subject to the terminal boundary condition  (µ, σ, λ, λ(, k)
The first-order conditions to (A.17) with respect to q and x are
Given the terminal utility specification, it is straightforward to show that the value function J is of
the form
with an associated marginal utility function
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under a constant investment opportunity set.  Furthermore, the value function and these portfolio
proportions satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for some functions   and   that g1 g2
appropriately converge to 1 as  . t 6 T
If  , myopic investment strategies are optimal even if investment opportunities R ' 1
 are stochastic.  Defining  , the objective function becomes (µt, σt, λ
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Consequently, the marginal utility 
is again of the form (A.21) above, and optimal portfolio proportions are given by (A.22) with  . R ' 1
A.3 Objective and risk-neutral distributions
Stock prices and pricing kernels are jump-dependent multiples of the dividend signal, which is in
turn a draw from jump-dependent mixture of lognormals.  From (29), gross stock returns are
for  .  The density function for   is κS ' (µd % ½σ
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for   equal to the normal density function with mean m and variance  .  Consequently, n(z * m, σ2) σ2
log-differenced stock prices   are also drawn from a mixture of normals: ∆s / ln[St /S0]
Define   as the delta function that takes on infinite value when  , zero value 1(∆s ' z) ∆s ' z
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neutral density function is
For any two normally distributed variables   and   and any arbitrary function  ,  ˜ x ˜ yh ( y)
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A.4 Implicit pricing kernels (equations (20) and (51))
Using equations (12) and (13), the projection of the pricing kernel upon the asset price in the
homogeneous-agent case is
where   and   capture time-dependent terms irrelevant to implicit risk aversion.  The κ0(t) κ1(t)
distribution of   is an  -dependent mixture of normals: st / ln St Nt
Consequently, the conditional expectation in (A.33) can be evaluated using Bayes’ rule to evaluate
the conditional probabilities44
M(St) ' κ1(t) S
&R
t
j
4
n'0
wn p(st*n) e Yn
j
4
n'0
wn p(st*n)
' κ(t) S
&R
t
p(st * λe Y )
p(st * λ)
(A.36)
&
MlnM(St)
Mst
' R %
&γd
σ
2
dt
Cov
((
0 (e Y ˜ n,˜ n)
E
((
0 [Y ˜ n]
(A.37)
ηt ' e
κη(T&t) S
&R
t
St
Dt
R
g Nt, t; λe
&Rγd
' e
(κη%Rκs)(T&t) S
&R
t m(Nt, t)R g Nt, t; λe
&Rγd .
(A.38)
yielding an implicit pricing kernel
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where   and  are defined with regard to the probabilities in (A.35).  Since   and n are E
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both increasing functions of n, the covariance term is positive.  Consequently, the implicit risk
aversion is everywhere positive given  . γd <0
The heterogeneous-agent case is similar.  From (28) and (29), the Lagrange multiplier is
This is of the same form as (A.33), with   replacing  .  Consequently, the m(Nt, t)R g(Nt, C) e
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implicit pricing kernel becomes45
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